The debate about whether or not to bail out the Big Three carmakers has been mischaracterised. It has been described as a package to help the undeserving dinosaurs of Detroit. In fact, a plan to bail out the carmakers would benefit shareholders and bondholders as much as anybody else. These are not the people that need help right now. In fact they contributed to the problem.
Financial markets are supposed to allocate capital and monitor that it is used to good effect. They are supposed to be rewarded when they do that job well, but bear the consequences when they fail. The markets failed. Wall Street's focus on quarterly returns encouraged the short-sighted behaviour that contributed to their own demise and that of America's manufacturing, including the automotive industry. Today, they are asking to escape accountability. We should not allow it.
What needs to be done is to help the automakers get a fresh start and allow them to focus on producing good cars rather than trying to juggle their books to meet past obligations.
The US car industry will not be shut down, but it does need to be restructured. That is what Chapter 11 of America's bankruptcy code is supposed to do. A variant of pre-packaged bankruptcy – where all the terms are set before going before the bankruptcy court – can allow them to produce better and more environmentally sound cars. It can also address legacy retiree obligations. The companies may need additional finance. Given the state of financial markets, the US government may have to provide that at terms that give the taxpayers a full return to compensate them for the risk. Government guarantees can provide assurances, as they did two decades ago when Chrysler faced its crisis.
With financial restructuring, the real assets do not disappear. Equity investors (who failed to fulfil their responsibility of oversight) lose everything; bondholders get converted into equity owners and may lose substantial amounts. Freed of the obligation to pay interest, the carmakers will be in a better position. Taxpayer dollars will go far further. Moral hazard – the undermining of incentives – will be averted: a strong message will be sent.
Some will talk of the pension funds and others that will suffer. Yes, but that is true of every investment that has diminished. The government may need to help some pension funds but it is better to do so directly, than via massive bail-outs hoping that a little of the money trickles down to the “widows and orphans”. Some will say that bankruptcy will undermine confidence in America's cars. It is the cars and carmakers themselves – and the dismal performance of their executives – that have undermined confidence. With industry experts saying $125bn (94bn, ￡84bn) or more will be needed, with bail-out fatigue setting in, why should US consumers believe that a $15bn gift will do the trick of a turnround?
It is more plausible that confidence will be restored if the industry is freed of the burden of interest payments and is given a fresh start. Modern cars are complex technological products and the US has demonstrated its strength in advanced technology. US workers, working for Japanese carmakers, have shown their hard work can produce cars that are desirable. America's managers too have demonstrated their managerial skills in many other areas.
The failure lies with the managers of US carmakers and America's financial markets, which failed in their oversight and encouraged short-sighted behaviour. The “bridge loan to nowhere” – the down payment on what could be a sinkhole of enormous proportions – is another example of the short-sighted behaviour that got us into this mess.
As the bail-outs continue, numbers that once looked huge are starting to seem almost normal. Hundreds of billons are being given to banks and insurance companies. AIG got $150bn. Compared with that $34bn, or even $125bn, for the automotive industry seems a modest request. Even so, we should not forget that a few months ago, President George W. Bush said there was not enough money for health insurance for poor children although it cost just a few billion dollars.
Even if Congress does now give carmakers $15bn as a “stay of execution,” postponing the hard decisions, before the next multi-billon dollar dose of medicine we need to think more carefully about who we are really bailing out and why. This should not end up as just another rescue package for bondholders and shareholders.
关于是否拯救美国三大汽车制造商的讨论，人们的描述一直存在错误。它被描述为帮助不值得援救的底特律庞然大物的计划。实际上，从汽车制造商救援计划中，股东和债券持有人获得的好处将与其他任何人一样多。他们不是急需援救的人。实际上，他们是问题的制造者。
金融市场理应进行资金配置，并监督其使用达到良性效果。如果任务圆满完成，那么它们应当得到奖励，一旦失败，也要承担后果。金融市场已经失灵。华尔街对季度回报的关注鼓励了短视行为，导致了自身的灭亡，也导致了包括汽车业在内的美国制造业的灭亡。如今，它们要求逃避责任。我们不应容许这种行为。
现在我们需要做的，是帮助这些汽车制造商重新开始，让它们把注意力集中在制造好车方面，而不是篡改账簿，以实践过去的义务。
美国汽车业不会倒闭，但它确实需要重组。这正是美国破产法第11章(Chapter 11)本应做的。一个变化的预先包装好的破产方案——在向破产法庭提出申请前，所有条款已经确定——可以让它们生产出质量更好、更环保的汽车。它还能解决退休人员的遗留成本问题。这些公司可能需要更多的融资。鉴于金融市场目前的状况，美国政府可能不得不按照让纳税人得到全额回报的条款为这些公司提供资金，以补偿纳税人承担的风险。政府担保能够让人们放心，就像20年前克莱斯勒(Chrysler)面临危机时那样。
进行金融重组，真正的资产不会消失。股票投资者（那些未能履行监督责任的人）失去了一切；债券持有人转换为股票持有者，可能也会损伤巨大。摆脱了支付利息的责任，这些汽车制造商将处于较好的境地。纳税人的钱将更有价值。道德风险——激励政策受到削弱——将得以避免：这将传递一个强大的信息。
一些人会提出，养老基金和其它机构将受损。是的，所有贬值的投资都是如此。政府可能需要帮助一些养老基金，但更好的办法是直接帮助，而不是通过大规模救援计划，指望其中的一点点钱最终能落在“孤儿寡母”手里。一些人会说，破产将挫伤消费者对美国汽车的信心。挫伤消费者信心的是汽车和汽车制造商自己——及其高管的糟糕表现。行业专家表示，美国汽车业需要1250亿美元或更多资金，同时救市疲劳症也开始出现，美国消费者为何应该认为，150亿美元的礼包会成功令该行业出现转机？
如果美国汽车业摆脱利息支付负担，并能够重新开始，信心就会得以恢复——这种说法看似更合理。现代的汽车是复杂的科技产品，美国已展现了自己在先进技术方面的优势。为日本汽车制造商工作的美国工人已经证明，他们的辛勤工作能够生产出人们想要的汽车。美国的经理人也显示了他们在许多其它领域的管理技能。
失败的是美国汽车制造商的管理者和美国的金融市场，他们未能进行良好监督，并鼓励短视行为。“无目的的过桥贷款”——向可能导致大幅亏损的项目支付的预付款——是令我们陷入这场混乱的短视行为的另一个例证。
随着救市计划的继续，那些曾经看上去无比巨大的数字正开始变得近乎正常起来。数千亿美元转到了银行和保险公司名下。美国国际集团(AIG)得到了1500亿美元。相比之下，美国汽车业提出的340亿美元甚至1250亿美元援救资金似乎是小巫见大巫。即便如此，我们也不应忘记，几个月前，美国总统乔治?布什(George W. Bush)曾表示，美国没有足够的钱为贫困儿童支付医疗保险，尽管这仅仅需要几十亿美元。
即便美国国会现在确实以“缓期执行”的方式，给美国汽车制造商提供150亿美元，将艰难决定向后推迟，但在抛出下一个几十亿美元的援救计划之前，我们必须更为认真地考虑我们实际拯救的对象和拯救的原因。这不应最后单纯变成对债券持有者和股东的又一个援救计划。
